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Abstract
What does representation mean when applied to international organizations? While many scholars working on
normative questions related to global governance often make use of the concept of representation, few have
addressed specifics of applying the concept to the rules and practices by which IOs operate. This article examines
representation as a fundamental, albeit often neglected, norm of governance which, if perceived to be deficient or
unfair, can interfere with other components of governance, as well as with performance of an organization’s core tasks
by undermining legitimacy. We argue that the concept of representation has been neglected in the ongoing debates
about good governance and democratic deficits within IOs. We aim to correct this by drawing on insights from
normative political theory considerations of representation. The article then applies theoretical aspects of
representation to the governance of the International Monetary Fund. We determine that subjecting IOs to this kind of
conceptual scrutiny highlights important deficiencies in representational practices in global politics. Finally, our
conclusion argues scholars of global governance need to address the normative and empirical implications of
conceptualizing representation at the supranational level.
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1. Introduction
International organizations (IOs) utilize various rules
and practices that govern specific internal functions
such as making decisions on lending projects. While
these rules can be manipulated by powerful states and
bypassed for political expediency, they are critical
components to an IO’s legitimacy. At times, IOs have
faced severe criticism and perceptions of bias, unfairness, rigidity and other sources of dissatisfaction with
internal governance. The internal governance of an IO
involves such matters as how an organization aggregates the preferences of its hundreds of members to
make and implement collective decisions. A lot of at-

tention has focused on whether or not the internal
governance of an IO meets certain standards associated with “good governance.” This literature has highlighted the real and perceived shortcomings of internal
governance using concepts such as democracy, legitimacy, accountability, transparency and, occasionally,
representation (Grant & Keohane, 2005; Woods, 1999,
2000). Democracy, the broadest of these terms, is said
to require legitimacy. Accountability, which is also seen
as necessary to both democracy and legitimacy, is usually thought to require a large measure of transparency. Representation is sometimes thrown in for good
measure, but rarely receives the close scrutiny afforded to the other properties. Whereas these properties
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are rightly conceived as complex, multidimensional and
worthy of conceptual explication, representation is
usually considered as if it were a plain-language term,
with a self-evident meaning, and therefore not in need
of systematic conceptualization.
When scholars address representation in IOs, they
may refer to the representation of civil society or the
representation of states. We concentrate our analysis
on the representation of states, although much of what
we consider potentially applies to civil society actors
too.1 We start from the premise that representation is
a fundamental norm of IOs’ governance which, if perceived by enough members to be deficient or unfair,
can interfere with the other components of governance, as well as with the performance of core tasks.
Flawed representation undermines process legitimacy,
i.e., the belief of members that the procedures by
which the organization’s rules and norms are made and
enforced are fair, consistent, and thereby deserving of
compliance. If representation is seen as flawed, biased
and illegitimate, then the rest of the IO’s decisions are
likely to be regarded as the outcome of a process that
itself lacks legitimacy and is not worthy of prima facie
compliance. As Plotke (1997, p. 27) emphatically puts it
(in a non-IO context), “representation is democracy,” in
the sense that, “it is crucial in constituting democratic
practices.” Without perceptions of fair representation,
governance reforms to improve accountability or democratic decision-making are suspect, and decisions relating to effective performance of functional missions
may also be viewed as inherently biased.
Before addressing the state of representation in IOs
we first examine how the concept of representation
has developed in the literature and how application of
this concept might illuminate the representational
practices of IOs. Conceptually, we posit that IO decision-making comprises a two-stage process. In the first
stage members are assigned respective voices in the
form of vote(s). The second stage consists of the translation of votes into seats on an IO’s apex body. Although this is not a hard-and-fast distinction, first-stage
decisions and procedures tend to be more formal, governed by codified instruments such as treaties. Secondstage decision-making is more opaque and tacit, based
on norms and informal practices.
We find that two broad connotations emerge from
representation that are especially relevant to IOs. One
1

NGOs and civil society organizations claim a representational
role, often via informal venues. These forms of nonterritorial
representation will have to be accounted for and incorporated
into more state-centric models. For now, however, we choose
to work on the conceptual foundations of representation
among sovereign states; see Warren and Castiglione (2004). A
case can also be made for providing representation to transnational corporations. Other candidates for enfranchisement in
IOs include the world’s “major cultures, religions, and civilizations” (Thakur, 1999, p. 3).
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 77-89

construes representation as something akin to a principal-agent (PA) relationship in which most issues revolve around some aspect of how the principal is
represented by the agent in legislative bodies. The other connotation, descriptive (or mirror) representation,
is instead concerned with how closely the composition
of a legislative body reflects the relevant characteristics
(e.g., size, wealth, race, class, gender) of the polity it
serves. For example, regionalism is a central organizing
principle of the UN System and used to help determine
how governments are selected for non-permanent
seats on the Security Council.
These two meanings of representation are not readily melded into a single concept, but each has some application to different parts of the complex array of the
internal governance of IOs. More specifically, descriptive
representation fits well the first-stage processes when
member states’ votes are allocated, while PA-type representation can be separately applied to the secondstage processes in which members are represented in
an IO’s apex body.2 This article demonstrates that descriptive representation describes only the first-stage
representation in IOs. Descriptive representation is not
able to account for the wide-variety of ways IOs utilize
the outputs from formal, first-stage determination of
representation. Future research utilizing the concept of
representation in IOs needs to identify this disjuncture
between the two forms of representation.
The next section surveys the primary meanings assigned to the concept of representation with reference
to IOs. Representation, in our view, is an evolving norm
that has been understudied by global governance
scholars. Following this we examine the numerous
principles IOs have employed to implement descriptive
representation. We then apply insights from the conceptual discussion to a single IO: the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Our conclusion points toward areas of future research and challenges others to more closely examine representation in international relations.
2. Representation
Over the long period stretching from the classical
Greek city-states to seventeenth century Europe, the
idea that representative government could substitute
for direct forms of democratic participation was not
widely regarded as workable or legitimate. Representation, as a way to overcome the limitations posed by
scale and distance, was thought to be a decidedly second-best alternative that is unable to satisfy democra2

Representation on an apex body involves a process that selects members from a more general body to the most important decision-making body and is used by most major IOs;
those with weighted voting systems and those with onecountry, one-vote rules.
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cy’s need for political equality (Dahl, 1989). 3 But the
ascendance of the much larger nation-state form of political organization strained the classical ideal of direct
democracy to an extent that, by the early nineteenth
century, “it was obvious and unarguable that democracy must be representative” (Dahl, 1989, p. 29). By the
end of the 20th century attitudes toward representation had changed 180 degrees: it was now regarded by
its advocates as the source of the “moral distinctiveness of modern democracy, and the sign of its superiority to direct democracy” (Kateb, 1992, pp. 36-56).
With the proliferation of IOs in the latter half of the
twentieth century, representational issues in IOs have
joined the longstanding debates over representation in
democratic polities, thereby extending the search for
ways to overcome the democracy-dampening effects
of (global) scale and distance, and to apply, “the logic
of equality to a large-scale political system” (Dahl,
1989, p. 215). As noted above, here we are concerned
with representation of states in IOs and not with civil
society as IOs have formal rules for the representation
of states.
2.1. Representation in Legislative Bodies
Theories of representation have appropriately focused
on the relationship between representatives and the
constituents they represent in legislative bodies, and
have asked questions, such as, how well are citizens
represented by those chosen as their representatives?
Do representatives have the a priori authorization of
those they represent? What lines of accountability are
drawn to ensure that the represented can replace
those who do not provide satisfactory representation?
Given the numerous avenues of investigation it is no
surprise that when the concept of representation is
scrutinized, authors add operative adjectives to label
specific connotations (Pollak, 2007, pp. 88-89).
Thus, in what Pitkin (1967, p. 145) terms the “central classic controversy,” advocates of the delegate interpretation contend that representatives are
obligated to act so as to reflect as closely as possible
the preferences of those they represent. 4 The opposing
3

trustee form of representation views the representative’s ideal role as requiring that she exercise her own
independent judgment in service of the collectivity’s
broader interests rather than the narrower preferences
or opinions of particular constituents. Another distinction is whether we conceive of representation in terms
of the activities (deliberation, decision-making, lawmaking) undertaken by representatives or as representatives collectively “standing for” those they represent either symbolically or in terms of one possible connotation
of descriptive representation (Pitkin, 1967).
This emphasis on representation as a kind of principal–agent problem, i.e., on the proper relationship between the representative and the represented, 5
provides interesting and valuable insights so long as we
are concerned with questions of how representation
operates in legislative bodies. But it is not as easily applied to other aspects of representation in IOs. Descriptive representation is more than merely the mirroring
of the identity and attributes of the represented in the
representative. Here we are not so much concerned
with the relationship between a particular country (or
its citizens) and the individuals that represent it in a
given IO. We are instead more interested in the terms
on which member states participate in IOs that are
charged with making and implementing collective decisions. To what extent do the institution’s procedures
impact the distribution of relevant attributes and resources across its members? Do these governance processes encourage or constrain the ability of a particular
member’s (or subset of members’) delegation to articulate its preferences and to influence outcomes? Answers to these questions get at the heart of recent
debates about voice reforms in IOs and are not readily
answered from a strictly PA approach. PA-type analyses of representation in IOs can be fruitful but they
are limited by the fact IOs are not legislative bodies.
There is a disconnection between PA-type concepts of
representation and their application to IOs when we
consider what Dovi (2006, p. 2) terms the four key
components of representation:
1. Some party that is representing;
2. Some party that is being represented;
3. Something that is being represented (opinions,
perspectives, interests);

On consideration of applying democratic principles to IOs in
general, see Dahl (1999) and Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik
(2009). While they do not devote much space to questions of
representation in IOs, the authors demonstrate that domestic
democracy is not necessarily weakened by the activities of
multilateral institutions; also see Rabkin (1998).
4 For modern applications, see Eulau and Karps (1977), Young
(2000), and Mansbridge (2003). There are also recent studies
that conceptualize aspects of representation in IOs. Kuper
(2004) extends to IOs the notion of representation as responsiveness; in this formulation, responsive representation results
from the activities of two types of agencies—accountability
and advocacy—that aggregate and connect constituents’ preferences to IO decision mechanisms. Rehfeld (2006) attempts a

general theory of representation that addresses another problem that arises in IOs: how to regard the representativeness of
representatives who have come to their position by other than
democratic means.
5 We use the terms principal and agent in a loose sense to categorize a family of approaches to representation. For the application of principal-agent theory to IOs, which posits member
states as principals and the international organization as agent,
see the selections in Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney
(2006), especially Broz and Hawes (2006) and Gould (2006);
see also Brown (2010).
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4. Political context, the setting within which the
activity of representation is taking place.
First note that the party that is represented (component 2) differs between the traditional conception of
representation and representation within IOs. The
former denotation puts individual citizens (or constituencies formed of citizens) in this category, while the
latter denotes territorial states as the represented parties. To construe representation in the principal-agent
form involves looking at components 1 and 2 and the
relationship between them. Institutional context—
including such structural features as methods of forming constituencies, proportional representation, one
country/one vote, weighted voting, special majorities—is relevant to all varieties of representation. Most
of the literature on representation entails consideration of all four components, with an emphasis on 1 and
2. If, however, we are interested in representation in
IOs, component 1 becomes less important and attention is shifted to how components 2 and 3 interact with
component 4. Despite the limitations of PA-type approaches, we are not ready to throw the baby out with
the bathwater since they may prove to have utility in
consideration of second-stage representation.
In sum, we contend that what Pitkin (1967) called
descriptive representation is more suitable to questions of first-stage representation in IOs while PA-type
analyses may have merit in second-stage considerations of representation.
2.2. Descriptive Representation
In descriptive representation, “a representative body is
distinguished by an accurate correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without
distortion” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60). Knight’s (2002, p. 24)
approach to the representativeness of the UN Security
Council as an “apex body”6 designates what is meant
by descriptive representation: “For an apex body to be
representative of the broader membership in an organization it must portray the values of the larger group;
present the ideas or views of that group; be typical of
that group’s geographical make-up, population base,
and political views; and act as a delegate of that group.”
The descriptive representativeness of an IO depends on how the characteristics Knight proposes are
filtered through its system of governance. Rogowski
(1981, pp. 398-399) refers to this as an institution’s
agreed social decision function. How accurately do the
prevailing governance procedures of an IO produce a
kind of “picture or map or mirror or sample” (Pitkin,
1967, p. 75)? For any given member, is its representa-

tion comparable to that of other members of like size,
contributions, or attributes? The representational criteria Rogowski (1981) suggests tap into what is meant
by descriptive representation in relation to how closely
an IO reflects the characteristics of its member states.
Is a given member represented fairly in the sense,
“that its actual power corresponds to its ostensible
power” under these rules? Are its preferences equally
weighted, i.e., do they “count” the same as any other
member’s? And, do members of like capacities enjoy
equally powerful representation in that their preferences are equally likely to influence outcomes. The first
of these, fairness (as indicated by correspondence of
actual and ostensible power) is directly pertinent to the
weighted voting systems used by many IOs.
Cogan’s (2009, p. 219) notion of an “[o]perational
constitution—the combination of formal and informal
rules that together regulate how international agreements are made and applied,” connotes much the
same meaning as Rogowski’s agreed social decision
function. In Cogan’s formulation, representation is implemented in several constitutive processes of IOs:
“The election of states to exclusive decision-making
bodies; the relative voting weights assigned to states;
the election and appointment of individuals of particular nationalities to high- and mid-level offices in IOs;
and the de facto devolution of appointment authority
for such offices to particular states or groups of states.”
Assessments of whether a member (or group of members) of a particular IO is fairly represented; or over- or
under-represented; or how accurately an IO in the aggregate “mirrors” the distribution of relative attributes
across its members all depend on the prior understanding of that IO’s institutional context.
Our brief survey of the literature on representation
reveals two main connotations that are useful in application to IOs. Most conceptions of representation focus on the relationship between the individual
representative and the constituents she represents.
We will suggest a role for this approach in application
to the second stage of IO decision making. The other is
descriptive representation, which focuses on the extent to which an IO reflects the composition of the international system within which it operates. This
variant of the concept provides a better fit with what
most observers mean when referring to representation
in IOs. Descriptive representation can be based on a
variety of principles and is a useful concept for assessing how closely an IO follows its specified representational principles in the process that determines
the voice of members.
3. Representational Principles for International
Organizations

6

Additionally, the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank
can be thought of as apex bodies in relation to the membership of these IOs.

Some standards are needed to assess descriptive representation to provide benchmarks against which the
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terms of members’ participation can be indexed and
compared. Here it is useful to think in terms of a combination of representational principles (Underhill,
2007) because it is unlikely that any one, serving by itself, will capture the complexities of institutional context in IOs. What principles are used in IOs and how
might they be augmented by new ones? In other
words, representational decisions are a fundamental
part of how IOs organize members (Cox & Jacobson,
1974, p. 9). We consider geopolitical representation,
regional representation, the role of population in determining representation, whether votes are weighted
or unweighted, the capacity of members to contribute
to an IO’s missions, representation of non-state actors,
and the representation of weaker members.
3.1. Geopolitical Representation
In the UN Security Council (UNSC) context, Knight
(2002, p. 25) makes the case for geopolitical representation, defined in terms of more balanced participation
along a North-South axis, and requiring that more
permanent or non-permanent UNSC seats be assigned
to developing countries. Much the same cleavage prevails in other IOs, such as in the World Bank’s IDA
where there is a division of seats between the wealthier shareholders who do not use facilities and their
poorer counterparts who do; this has been a longstanding fault line in global governance. This is the key
representation grievance contested in many IOs involved in development policy and reform proposals
typically call for providing more voice for developing
countries vis-à-vis their lender counterparts. The World
Bank’s recent voice reforms, for instance, resulted in
major changes in the absolute number of votes for
many emerging market economies, although this did
not result in shifting the relative shares of votes in their
favor (Strand & Trevathan, 2016; Vestergaard & Wade,
2013). In sum, there are long-established practices using geopolitical factors in descriptive representation.

point out that regions are malleable entities and that
regionalism is a subjective construct based on sentiment as much or more as on geography. From this
standpoint, questions arise about whether geographic
regions, especially outside of Europe, are actually a
“unit of cohesion” (Thakur, 1999, p. 9) or “simply a
convenient way of organizing the world for electoral
purposes” (Agam, 1999, p. 42). Regardless of which
view one takes, there are examples of IOs using regional distribution rules. The regional development
banks (RDBs) take geopolitical representation into account as they bifurcate membership into regional and
non-regional members, often with complex rules on
the relative shares held by each (Strand, 2014). For instance, in the Inter-American Development Bank, the
U.S. and Canada are guaranteed a minimum share of
votes (30 percent and 4 percent respectively) and regional borrowers are guaranteed a collective share of
50.005 percent (Strand, 2003).
3.3. One-Country/One-Vote
The sovereign equality of states principle is employed
in some IOs, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA)
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The general
criticism of this representational principle, often raised
in reference to the UNGA, is that the larger and more
powerful members will not cede decisive power-overoutcomes to smaller, less powerful members, and that
the former therefore make certain that no matter of
any consequence is determined by the one-country/
one-vote rule. For other IOs, there is not universal reliance upon a system of weighted voting as many consider it too closely resembling the shareholder model
characteristic of corporate governance. Hence, with a
nod toward the sovereign equality of states, a number
of “basic votes” are allocated to each member. Basic
votes can be viewed as contributing to minority representation (see below) but for the most part they are
only symbolically important in vote allocation.

3.2. Regional Representation

3.4. Representation by Population

Gaining legitimacy during a period of widespread decolonization, the representation of geographical regions
has been well-entrenched in the post-WWII international order, particularly in the UN. This principle overlaps considerably with Knight’s geopolitical variant. An
example of dissent over regional representation is the
near consensus among those who follow the IMF that
Europe is significantly over-represented in terms of both
votes and Executive Board seats at the expense of
emerging market governments in Asia and Africa (Rapkin
& Strand, 2005). Moreover, this assessment of regional
imbalances holds for virtually any representational
principles one might apply. Others who argue that regions are of diminished importance to representation

Another principle is the familiar and conceptually simple one-person/one-vote rule, behind which stands
much liberal democratic practice. Proposals to implement this principle internationally have predictably run
aground of great powers’ unwillingness to concede majority control in IOs to more populous “lesser” powers.
In recent years, however, the emergence of more
powerful and highly populated China and India blur this
distinction in IOs like the IMF and World Bank. Population, however, is rarely mentioned in discussions of
IMF and World Bank reforms. Indeed, proposals to take
population into account in the determination of votes
have been dismissed on grounds that population is not
relevant to their missions. There remains, however, a
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modicum of support for inclusion of population (Bryant,
2008, Appendix 1). In the UN, various proposals have
been floated to weight votes using population as at least
one factor to determine representation (Schwartzberg,
2003; Strand & Rapkin, 2011). Note that using population to weight votes moves representation by population away from the principle of equality of (state) voters.
For IOs to claim any sort of democratic basis it may well
prove difficult to continue excluding population, as a
strong case can be made that decision-making in the
most important IOs should pay heed to the size of a
country’s population (Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2006).7
3.5. Weighted Voting
Weighted voting is a dominant representational principle shaping the distribution of votes in numerous IOs.
Borrowed from methods of private corporate governance, it is also known as the shareholder model since
each owner of X-number of shares of a firm’s stock
controls a corresponding number (X) of votes. The basis for weighting the number of shares held is relatively
noncontroversial in the corporate governance case, but
the shareholder model becomes more problematic
when applied to governance of IOs. The fundamental
question is what features of members should be used
to weight votes? IOs that use weighted voting employ
indicators of relative weight in the world economy, as
indicated by shares of world product, trade, and reserves, but there are other factors determining the final outcomes of the process (e.g., basic votes, regional
distribution rules, political pressure by more powerful
governments). Whether these criteria continue to accurately represent the relative importance of countries
in the 21st century is a contested question. The selection of seemingly objective economic criteria is anything but simple or apolitical, as variables as simple as
national product can be operationalized in many ways
and the choice of measure has voting share distributional consequences. Changes in how the indicators are
operationalized can significantly affect the relative distribution of votes. In sum, weighted voting is a common way to account for perceived or real imbalances in
the relative importance of members, but there is no
truly impartial way to determine relative shares and
currently used processes are wrought with political
maneuvering by governments looking to manipulate
their relative position (Rapkin & Strand, 2006).
3.6. Capacity Representation

those members with the greatest capacity to contribute to the success of the organization’s primary missions are entitled to greater representation because
they perform “differential responsibilities” (Cogan,
2009, p. 312). This functionalist principle can be interpreted as a criterion for allocation of seats, e.g., those
UN members with the greatest capacity to contribute
to peace and security are deserving of seats in the
UNSC (Knight, 2002, pp. 26-27). The same kind of standard often arises in the context of what types of capacities should be included in a weighted voting system. In
other words, how should capacity be defined and operationalized? Capacity to contribute may vary greatly from
one IO to another as the missions of IOs differ as well as
what it means to contribute resources in support of an
IO’s mission (e.g., financial contributions, technical assistance, peacekeeping personnel, etc.).
3.7. Stakeholder Representation
Stakeholder representation refers to the formation of
constituencies among members who share interests or
functionally-defined roles. This corporatist approach to
representation is easiest to implement with multiple
majority decision rules. In the Global Environmental
Facility, for example, if a consensus decision encompassing donor and recipient countries cannot be
reached, the decision rule defaults to a double majority
mechanism requiring separate 60 percent majorities of
the votes of both donors and recipients. The International Seabed Authority extends further the logic of
corporatist representation: successful initiatives must
gain the majority approval of four groups of stakeholders: consumers, investors, net exporters, and developing countries. Different kinds of representational
problems arise from the increasing number of claims of
stakeholder status made by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).8 Yet another example of stakeholder
representation is found in the International Coffee Organization where members are separated into coffee
importers and coffee exporters with weighted voting
within each group and decisions requiring support of
both importers and exporters. Extending the concept
of stakeholder beyond representatives of governments, to perhaps corporations and civil society organizations, is seen by some as one way to augment global
democracy. Such a broad view of stakeholder interests,
however, may attenuate the willingness of states to
delegate authority to IOs and representation is likely to
remain focused on the state (Zürn & Walter-Drop,
2011, p. 275.). Furthermore, non-state stakeholders in

Capacity representation refers to the principle that
8

For a quite different general view on the diminished importance of population, see McNicoll’s (1999, pp. 411-412)
useful discussion of what he terms “demographic inconsequence.”

See Kahler (2004, pp. 150-154) for a discussion of whether
providing representation to causes already likely to be supported by the national governments of wealthier members but
opposed by many developing countries provides a kind of representational “double counting.”
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global governance present an assortment of accountability concerns (Grant & Keohane, 2005).
3.8. Minority Representation
In descriptive representation there are often concerns
about the representation of minority positions which
may lead to efforts “to prevent possible tyranny of the
majority,” by “strengthen[ing] representation of the
numerically or otherwise weak and to grant them a
formal role in decision-making” (Underhill, 2007, p. 8).9
Intersecting with the concept of minority representation, as well as with stakeholder representation, is the
idea that representation should be provided to those
who are most affected by the policies resulting from
the decisions of the majority. Protection of minority
shareholders’ rights is a best-practice benchmark of
corporate governance that could also be applied in IOs,
primarily by improving accountability and transparency. Many IOs have implemented accountability mechanisms owing in part to these concerns. In decisionmaking, there have been concrete measures proposed
to increase minority representation in the executive
boards of the Bretton Woods institutions including setting up a committee comprised of minority (debtor)
executive directors to audit the activities of the majority and replacing the opaque consensual decisionmaking process with recorded votes. 10 Moreover, the
World Bank recently expanded the number of voting
groups dedicated to African governments in order to
increase their representation.
4. Implications of Representative Principles
Consideration of representational principles reveals
two main connotations that are useful in application to
IOs. One focuses on the relationship between the individual representative and the constituents she represents (as reflected in the principal–agent formulation
applied to second-stage representation). The other is
first-stage, descriptive representation, which focuses on
the extent to which an IO reflects the configuration of
the international system within which it operates. For
many IOs where decisions are made on how to allocate
scarce resources, some form of weighted voting seems
necessary to provide representation that accommodates
disparities in size, power, and systemic importance of
states and that is capable of adapting to changes in this
composition. In this context, voting systems amount to
ongoing experiments in institutional design.
9

See Guinier (1994) and Young (2000) for advocacy of special
arrangements to provide minority representation. Phillips
(2003) makes a similar argument regarding the exclusion of
women from systems of representation.
10 These ideas have been suggested by Marfan (2001). For discussions of Marfan’s work, see Kapur and Naim (2005).
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The above principles are manifest in the representation systems of IOs but there is no systematic, nor in
our view straightforward, way to mesh them into a single set of procedures to represent states in IOs. Put differently, there is no ideal system of representation that
is technically superior and that all members of IOs
agree upon. Not only will any such system be politicized to some degree, it will also be a hybrid in so far as
it will necessarily consist of some mix of the above representational principles. This leaves open the possibility
that the mix will be a kind of hodge-podge, resulting
from lowest-common-denominator compromises and
from the preferences of the most powerful members.
Nevertheless, we next turn to a brief sketch of key rules
and practices that constitute the two forms of representation to a single institutional context: the IMF.11
4.1. Application of Representation Principles
In order to focus our discussion, we first examine vote
determination in the IMF. The authority of the IMF has
waxed and waned over the last several decades. From
a pivotal position in the development discourse as purveyor of the Washington Consensus and enforcer of
neoliberalism, the Fund’s influence diminished in the
face of widespread dissatisfaction with its performance, especially since meeting its “Stalingrad” in the
form of the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s.
By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century,
numerous journalistic articles, academic papers, and
NGO reports described an IMF wracked by crises of
confidence, identity, credibility, budget, role or purpose, and/or legitimacy, some of which, singly or in
combination, were said to constitute an existential crisis. Its outstanding loans shrank, debtor countries paid
their IMF loans early, and the number of borrowers
seeking new loans diminished. During the same period,
major economies in East Asia began to explore institutional alternatives by entering into currency swap arrangements that operate with only modest input from
the IMF. The institution came to be described as obsolete, adrift, groping for a mission, and sliding into deserved irrelevance (Griesgraber, 2009; Seabrooke,
2007; Torres, 2007). Then the financial meltdown of
2007–2008 restored the perceived need for the IMF
and its crisis management role (Broome, 2010). Resources were again appropriated for the IMF and
bailouts of developing countries on the wrong end of
payments imbalances proceeded.
Some of the IMF’s problems are attributable to
changes in the world economy, particularly the availability of alternative sources of finance provided by the
rapid expansion of private capital markets, as well as
11

For more detailed consideration of IMF rules and practices,
see Strand (2014), Rapkin and Strand (2005), and Bryant
(2008).
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the emergence of nascent regional and global financial
facilities. Yet another source of the Fund’s difficulties
stems from perceptions of bias, unfairness, rigidity and
other sources of dissatisfaction with the IMF’s internal
governance, that is, how the organization aggregates the
preferences of its members to make and implement collective decisions. Most often faulted on this score are
perceived shortcomings in democracy, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and representation.
The IMF is a case where some studies focus only on
first-stage concerns while others highlight secondstage issues of representation. While space does not allow for a comparative analysis, we think a focus on the
IMF helps illustrate why our distinction between stages
of representation is warranted. Applying notions of
representation to the IMF is complicated by several
features of the IO’s governance. First, the representation of members unfolds across two separate, but
linked, stages. First-stage representation is reflected in
the IMF’s complex system of weighted voting, wherein
the number of weighted votes assigned to each member is (nearly) proportional to its quota which, in turn,
is supposed to be a function of members’ relative size
in the world economy. The methods by which quotas
are determined are in principle objective and replicable, though in practice the process has been opaque at
various junctures and has frequently been subject to
political interference; perhaps akin to how the voting
rights and representation of certain individuals in domestic political systems has been historically disrupted
by powerful political forces. Second, first-stage representation provides inputs to the construction of second-stage representation in the IMF’s Executive Board
(EB). Over the past several years, reforms to IMF governance languished largely due to inaction by the U.S.
The reforms include central aspects of representation
of states and highlight how concerns about how states
are represented in an IO can undermine the ability of
an IO to carry out its mandates (Seabrooke, 2007). Before moving on, we note that consideration of the two
stages of representation applies to other IOs, not just
those utilizing weighted voting systems. Most IOs use
some form process to select members from a more
general body to a smaller body with a lot of authority.

IMF voting shares are derived from IMF quotas; quotas
are often referred to as the “building blocks” of IMF
governance and serve multiple purposes in the institution’s internal governance regime, including influencing
its representation in the EB. Quotas themselves are supposed to reflect countries’ relative weight in the international economy, as determined by a set of variables.
General Quota Reviews are undertaken at five-year
intervals with the primary purpose of adjusting repre-

sentation to reflect changes in members’ relative positions in the world economy, as well as accommodating
entry of new members, and making various ad hoc adjustments. At least in principle then, representation of
governments in the IMF is designed to be flexible and
responsive to shifts in the distribution of economic
power among its members. To be sure, political leverage has been exercised by the major creditors at various points in the vote determination process.
Moreover, reasonable observers disagree about
whether the quota regime has inflated the quotas of
the developed countries at expense of debtor countries’ quotas. This issue entails consideration of the effects of the choice of variables, weights, and formulas
used to determine quotas.
Until 2008, quotas were derived from, but not
strictly determined by, a complex system of five formulas based on GDP, the values and variability of receipts
(exports), payments (imports), and international reserves. We concur with Bryant’s (2008, p. 2) contention
that, “adopting a better formula [consisting of the variables chosen, their measurement, and how they are
weighted] is the single most important requirement for
successful governance reform for the IMF.” Given their
building block function, it is especially important that
quotas be determined by a process that is regarded as
transparent and fair (Bird & Rowlands, 2006). But no
clear, persuasive rationale has ever been provided for
the original set of variables included, the weights assigned to them, or the distributive outcomes produced.
It is clear that these aspects of vote determination procedures were thoroughly politicized from the outset and
that particular principles behind quotas were adopted
out of political expediency. In 2008, reforms were introduced including the move to a single formula. The new
formula includes GDP, a five-year moving average of
payments and receipts, the variability of current receipts
and capital flows, and reserves. Share of global product
is comprised of PPP-GDP and market exchange rate GDP
and the variable is weighted to account for half of members’ quotas. Arguably, this simplified formula is an improvement over the previous configuration of five
formulas, though it remains awkward and intricate.
The connection between these specific economic
variables and the (descriptive) representation of governments in an IO is not obvious as there are other
guiding factors (e.g., capacity to contribute or population) that arguably can be relevant. Principles not incorporated in IMF vote determination tell us a lot
about how influential members and dominant ideas
about representation lead to the selection of specific
principles from a larger set of possible ways to determine representation.
One area in vote determination that suggests attention is paid to stakeholder and minority representation
is the allocation of basic votes. In addition to the votes
generated by the quota process, each member country
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4.2. First Stage Representation: Determination of
Voting Shares

is assigned basic votes. Until recently, basic votes have
amounted to an all-time low of barely more than two
percent of the total votes, down from the original 11.3
percent agreed on in 1944 at Bretton Woods and from
the historic high in 1958 of 15.6 percent. The 2008 reforms increased basic votes to 5.5 percent. Basic votes
result in an increase in the relative voice of those
members with very low quotas, but matter little in the
representation of large vote holders.
In sum, the determination of voting shares as an
exercise in defining the representation of governments
in the IMF has, from its inception, often been subject
to political manipulation and remains flawed in the
ways described, especially the selection of variables,
weights, and formula(s). Let us assume for the sake of
argument that the vote determination process, the results of which we have termed first-stage representation, yields perfectly formed building blocks that are
then used by members as they cast votes. How then
does this distribution of votes translate into second
stage representation on the EB? And, from a conceptual standpoint, what definition of representation best
captures decision making itself?
4.3. Second Stage Representation: The Executive Board
Second stage representation involves selective representation whereby most members are aggregated into
voting groups for representation on the EB. Members’
votes—the product of first stage calculations—are
used to form voting groups and to elect representative
to the EB. These elected Executive Directors (EDs) decide on the substantive and procedural issues that
comprise the business of the IMF. The EB and its constituencies use a consensual decision-making in which
informal deliberations often take place outside the designated venues, votes are rarely taken, and representation therefore becomes murky and harder, if not
impossible, to directly measure or replicate. Relatively,
the determination of votes is transparent when compared to the more opaque and indirect representation
on the EB. Descriptive representation does not shed
light on second stage decision-making.
We first note that another feature of the IMF’s that
confounds efforts to assess representation is that there
are several informal rules used by the Fund: “Formal
rules are…enacted through accepted decision-making
processes. Informal rules…do not pass through these
processes” (Cogan, 2009, pp. 214-215). “Much of international decision making is done through informal
processes…In no area is this more apparent than in the
realm of agreements concerning international representation” (Cogan, 2009, p. 227). For example, it is impossible to assess the additional “representation” that
has accrued to European members from the longstanding practice that the IMF Managing Director is always a European. Surely this informal convention reguPolitics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 77-89

lating leadership selection has redounded to European
advantage in manifold ways. Other informal practices
have likewise had significant representational implications such as the selection of staff (Momani, 2007). Accordingly, in the balance of the article we narrow our
focus to the formal operation of the EB.
In the EB, three formal rules have consequences for
representation. First, the Fund requires the aggregate
votes of each constituency be cast as a block. Second,
elected EDs are not considered representatives. Third,
the EB uses a variety of qualified majorities, which combined with weighted voting underscores the power of
the larger vote holders. Formal rules and informal practices used by the EB have a variety of consequences for
representation in the Fund. In this section we detail
how these rules and practices distort representation
principles.
The first response to questions about how first
stage results plug into second stage decision making is,
as Lombardi (2009, p. 16) puts it, that “[t]he distribution of quotas heavily affects the allocation of seats in
the…executive board.” At its inception, the 39 members
of the IMF were served by twelve Executive Directors
(EDs), one each for the five largest shareholders and
seven others elected by voting groups. Each ED represented, on average, 3.25 members. In consequence of
the many new post-colonial members, by 1964 the EB
had been expanded to 20 seats (serving a total membership of 93, or 4.65 members each). Subsequent additions—Saudi Arabia (1978), China (1980), Russia and
others (1990–1992)—increased the EB to twenty-four.
The Board is currently comprised of seven singlemember chairs: an ED appointed by each of the five
largest shareholders, and one each from Saudi Arabia
and Russia. EDs from the five largest shareholders are
appointed for an indefinite term. Elected EDs serve a
two-year term which, according to some observers, “is
too short…to master all the complexities of IMF operations, to establish productive relations with management, the staff and fellow directors and to become fully
effective” (Portugal, 2005, p. 79). The resulting differences in experience and learning are manifest in disparities in the ability, “to develop institutional memories and
expertise in how to function in the IMF…to negotiate effectively and to shape the issues and decisions around
which the consensus must form” (Bradley, 2006, p. 11).
Elected EDs generally are the members with the
most votes within their voting groups. This artifact of
group formation magnifies the distribution of votes
that emerges from the first stage process so that creditors control EB seats. Not only is there is a strong tendency for the members with the most votes to control
voting groups, but EDs cast the total voting weights
held by all members in its voting group as a bloc. 12 The
12

See Strand and Retzl (2016) for analysis of selective representation and voting groups in the World Bank.
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absurdity of these arrangements from a representational standpoint is obvious when one considers that
members of the same constituency have at times been
engaged in conflict yet their votes were cast by their
ED as a bloc. Once elected, an ED can only be replaced
at the time of the next election. As Woods & Lombardi
(2006, p. 10) point out, any borrower country strategy
that relies on, “[j]oining forces with one another does
not give them adequate voting power to set or influence the agenda.” This constraint is made even more
binding by the prohibition on splitting the votes of constituencies even when members within a constituency
have major disagreements. As Martinez-Diaz (2009, p.
397) concludes “the voice and voting power of small
shareholders is diluted in multi-country constituencies.” Notably, recent reforms will change the current
system of ED selection to one where all EDs will be
elected. The fact that an ED has been elected by the
other members in his voting group, according to Gianviti, (1999, p. 48), “does not create an obligation for
him to defer to their views or to cast their votes in accordance with their instructions.” These restrictive decision rules magnify the power over outcomes of
lending countries while reducing that of borrowing
countries. For those developing countries which are
members of mixed constituencies their votes are in effect a kind of “dead wood,” unable to be mobilized for
building coalitions supportive of borrower interests
with other developing countries. Worse yet, they can
be deployed by the mixed constituency EDs in support
of initiatives that favor creditor interests. In this fashion, the composition of the EB and its particular form
of consensus decision making combine to strengthen
the representation of developed countries beyond that
already reflected in their sizeable majority of votes. As
a corollary, whatever representation is indicated by
developing country shares of votes is discounted and
deeply distorted by the EB’s consensual decision rules.
Undercutting any notion of representation is the simple fact the current process does not provide mechanisms by which an elected ED can be held accountable
to other members of his or her constituency.
IMF governance reforms agreed to in 2008 and
2010 tinkered with the representation of members but
did not result in major realignments (Lesage, Debaere,
Dierckx, & Vermeiren, 2013; Wade & Vestergaard,
2015).13 Dissatisfaction with representational outcomes of the reforms contributed to the U.S. delay in
approving the 2010 reforms. Changes to how representational principles are operationalized in the IMF that
13

In the context of a legitimacy maintenance strategy,
Guastaferro and Moschella (2012) consider the IMF’s 2010 reforms as part of the Fund’s “representative turn.” In our context here, however, the reforms fail to fundamentally change
the conceptual and practical divide between descriptive representation and second-stage representation.
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are part of the 2010 reforms were effectively blocked for
years since the U.S. holds a de facto veto. Now that reforms are approved, we note that they primarily address
first-stage representation and do little to ameliorate
problems with second-stage representation in IMF.
5. Conclusions
We argue that the concept of descriptive representation
fits reasonably well the process of first-stage representation in IOs. Though imperfect, the vote-determination
process allows agreed upon representational principles
to be operationalized to establish members’ voices, influence, and votes as an exercise in representation. Descriptive representation, however, is not very useful to
understanding second stage representation in IOs. Further analysis is needed to determine if there is a PAtype of representation that applies and helps to understand second-stage representation. Such an approach
can analyze the relationship between the representative and her constituents and address traditional questions such as: how well does a representative
represent her constituents: As a delegate or a trustee?
Is she responsive to constituency preferences? Is she
an effective advocate? Is she accountable (and to
whom)? In theory such an approach to second stage
representation could address these questions about
representation in an IO setting. In our brief case on the
IMF, however, the representational practices employed at the second-stage garbles the inputs from the
first stage to a point where the concept may cease to
be valuable. Application of our approach to other IOs
can help shed light on how informal processes clash
with formal arrangements as they do in the IMF.
In other words, what kind of representation:
• Exists when the IO itself eschews the term representation and expressly denies that EDs are representatives of their voting groups?
• Heightens the biased distribution of votes that
emerges from the first stage determination process so that creditors control even more seats on
the apex body?
• Allows EB matters to be decided in extrainstitutional venues by subsets of members?
• Does not always permit small country representatives to play a role in formulation of their constituencies’ policy positions?
• Licenses representatives (i.e., EDs) to ignore the
interests of those who elected them by allowing
representatives to cast constituents’ own votes
against their expressed preferences?
• Does not provide mechanisms by which EDs can
be held accountable to voting group members for
their performance?
The point is not that all decision-making tramples
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on the norm of representation in the various ways described in the worst practices catalog we have assembled from the case on the IMF. But for those who are
concerned with questions of whether global democracy is possible in IOs, the IMF case offers mixed lessons.
Even if vote determination were perfectly aligned with
members’ expectations of what principles representation should be based on, the aggregation of members
into voting groups stretches even the most elastic definition of representation into an unrecognizable set of
processes that may undermine legitimacy of the IO.
The IMF case illustrates the pathologies that can ensue
when the second stage processes are divorced from
descriptive representation.
We launched into this article to challenge others to
deal more directly with representation in global governance. The two principal connotations of representation do fit IOs but in an inelegant, indeed awkward,
way. The first stage is best construed as descriptive
representation in which the objective is for the distribution of votes to mirror as closely as possible the core
representation principles used by the IO. The second
stage encompasses various formal and informal decision rules that use the first stage representational outputs to arrive at decisions. Instead of descriptive
representation the more common view of representation involving principals and agents is germane to the
operation of IOs. At present, these two formulations are
simply juxtaposed and not easily melded into a single,
comprehensive concept of representation. Despite the
awkward fit, we did find that subjecting one IO to this
kind of conceptual scrutiny highlights important deficiencies in its representational practices. We believe
similar results will be found in other IOs. Clearly the concept of representation needs to be incorporated into the
more general discourse about institutional design and
the possibility of democratic values in IOs.
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